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As prime minister, Pierre Trudeau's involvement in issues of nuclear arms control and grand strategy is usually attributed to the early days of his government or to his final days in power. At the start of his leadership was the series of decisions beginning in 1969 to terminate nuclear weapon operational roles for Canadian forces, first in Europe and then in Canada. 1 Toward the end of his tenure as prime minister was his "peace initiative" of 1983-84 with its aim to revitalize East-West strategic cooperation during one of the darkest periods of the Cold War. Given that public displays of original thinking by a NATO member on strategic relations were not exactly smiled upon by Washington, or by its junior nuclear weapon partner the UK, Trudeau's speech was also remarkable in its willingness to advocate new policy directions for the nuclear powers that went beyond their comfort zones.
How such an innovative address was developed by the bureaucracy and championed by the highest political level is the focus of this article. It considers the context in which the Canadian position for UNSSOD I was formed and the aims the then Department of External Affairs developed for this unprecedented UN session. It then tries to identify the influences on the Canadian statement, including the personal interest the prime minister showed in the initiative, as it went through various drafts, and assess its key ideas. It concludes with some reflections on the impact of the speech and its significance for future Canadian and multilateral arms control and disarmament policy.
The UN and the Disarmament Issue
The United Nations General Assembly has been preoccupied from its inception with the pursuit of international security and the need for disarmament. Indeed, the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its inaugural session in January 1946 was devoted to these concerns and in particular to the threat posed by the atomic bomb. The title of the first resolution was "Establishment of a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy" and the Atomic Energy Commission it created was tasked with developing proposals for inter alia "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." 3 Initial efforts to reach a consensus on a mechanism for the international control of atomic energy and the elimination of nuclear weapons quickly foundered in the face of mistrust among the leading powers with the advent of the Cold War. The General Assembly's concern with the threats posed by what became known as weapons of mass destruction only deepened in the subsequent years as the animosity of the Cold War and the arms race grew more intense. With the Security Council, the UN's principal organ for dealing with threats to international peace and security, effectively paralyzed due to Cold War conflict, states had to look to the General Assembly to express the concerns of the UN membership. Its annual sessions would routinely generate several resolutions on the disarmament theme, but to scant practical effect. The "near death experience" of the Cuban missile crisis and growing public concern over the deleterious effects of radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear testing did lead in 1963 to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, but little else in terms of multilateral accomplishments. In 1969 the General Assembly declared a "Disarmament Decade" in an effort to encourage states to take further 3 UN General Assembly Resolution 1, 24 January 1946.
action. The conclusion of the (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT, which entered into effect in 1970) was an important achievement in halting the spread of nuclear weapons but had little impact on the quantitative and qualitative growth of nuclear arsenals on the part of the nuclear weapon states. The negative implications of this superpower arms race for both the security and the developmental goals of the UN were increasingly in evidence.
Against this backdrop, the General Assembly decided to convene the first special session of the assembly to be devoted to disarmament, and UNSSOD I was duly scheduled for the period 
Developing a Canadian Position
The responsibility for developing a Canadian reply to the secretary general's request fell to the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs. Its director, T.C. Hammond, who had considerable insight into nuclear affairs from his earlier posting at Canada's delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, was the author of the initial memorandum outlining a possible course of action. Hammond proposed that Canada's priority goals for the special session should be to promote "effective measures to curb the superpower arms race" and to seek "to buttress the nonproliferation system by mitigating its current discriminatory features."
4 The reference to "discriminatory features" reflected concerns that the recently concluded NPT set up a two-tier category of membership-the five nuclear weapon states and all the rest, the non-nuclear weapon states. While this was to be only a temporary distinction pending achievement of the nuclear disarmament foreseen in the treaty, the Cold War build-up of nuclear arsenals was already raising concerns that the categories of nuclear haves and have nots would become permanent.
In his memorandum, Hammond related these broad goals to specific objectives such as extending the existing partial ban on nuclear tests to a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear testing and negotiating a convention to ban chemical weapons. Hammond also stressed the responsibility of the superpowers to take action to stem the nuclear arms race, urging "the two major nuclear weapon powers to intensify their efforts to reach further agreements to curtail the strategic nuclear arms confrontation in both its quantitative and its qualitative dimensions."
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Behind all these proposals was a reflection of the strategic goals of curbing the nuclear arms race (by constraining vertical proliferation based on nuclear testing) and removing discriminatory The policy development process for UNSSOD I went into higher gear early in 1978 with attention focused on how specifically the goal of curbing the superpower arms race could be carried out. One step would be to stop the production of the fissile materials (i.e., the enriched uranium and plutonium) that were the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. The idea of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, an objective the UN General
Assembly had endorsed since 1957, was a natural link to the goal of countering both vertical and horizontal proliferation. If the fissile material tap were turned off, no new nuclear weapons could be manufactured. References to the envisaged Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) began to feature in departmental communications although, given the possibility of a cool response from some nuclear allies, the minister was consulted in February 1978 regarding whether to include the FMCT among the Canadian proposals to be put forward at the UN. Ministerial guidance was cautious, suggesting that the department "continue our soundings about attitudes of other governments towards cut-off idea" and flagging that a "crucial factor in Canada's decision will be attitude of Americans." 11 DEA officials working on international security files would be equally sensitive to the views of Canada's principal ally.
While consultations were pursued with US officials, Washington did not appear to oppose the FMCT idea, and there was even evidence that the Americans were contemplating putting forward at UNSSOD a proposal similar to the Canadian one. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) had been conducting a study on the cutoff idea, which was still ongoing at the time of UNSSOD but led allies to inquire as to American intentions. UK was concerned with the non-discriminatory feature of the proposal and the requirement to accept intrusive verification that would flow from any such treaty. Hammond was robust in rebutting this concern, writing that "Verification remains fundamental and integral part of Canadian arms control and disarmament policy and without this element, proposal would be meaningless and unacceptable." 13 Although Allied reaction was a concern, the FMCT proposal was retained for the time being in the Canadian repertoire for UNSSOD.
A Metaphor Emerges and Prime Ministerial Engagement
While Hammond and his colleagues regarded maintaining the integrity of the Canadian proposals as a prime concern, there was also the question of how best to depict these proposals when they were eventually presented in public as part of the Canadian statement at UNSSOD I.
The metaphor of suffocation that was ultimately applied to the Canadian ideas for countering the arms race appears to have originated in a communication from Hammond to Klaus Goldschlag, the responsible assistant undersecretary, when the former noted that regardless of the actual outcome of the special session, Canada "can make a clear statement based on a serious analysis of the present strategic situation and advocating specific steps to initiate the process of throttling the nuclear arms race." 14 Hammond may have been playing back a variant to his superior that the latter had already introduced into the departmental vocabulary. According to Legault and Fortman, in their study of Conference, having noted that he received his instructions from a joint DEA-DND committee, remarked, "To say that disarmament did not rank as a high priority with either department would be an understatement." What support for robust action there was, he continued, "was largely because of the importance the prime minister personally seemed to attach to the issue. To my pleasant surprise he invited me to spend an evening at 24 Sussex Drive when I was in Canada for a brief visit, and I found that we were in fundamental agreement on the need to do whatever we could to slow down or preferably reverse the nuclear arms race."
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The development of the draft speech seems to have fallen largely to Klaus Goldschlag 
The Strategy of Suffocation Explained
The speech delivered by Prime Minister Trudeau still stands up, over three decades later, as a powerful example of oratory and model for generating a creative menu of measures available to the international community to counter the nuclear juggernaut, in spite of the fact that few were actually taken up in the form Trudeau advocated.
Trudeau, perhaps conscious that some might view his effort to advise the superpowers as presumptuous, begins by laying out Canada's credentials for addressing the nuclear problem. It is, after all, a country "geographically placed between two heavily armed superpowers, with an 22 Note from Klaus Goldschlag to PM, via Minister of External Affairs, 11 May 1978. obvious stake in the prevention of war in a nuclear age." 23 Despite belonging to a defensive alliance that includes three out of the five nuclear weapon states, "We are none the less a country that has renounced the production of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons under our control. We have withdrawn from any nuclear role by Canada's armed forces in Europe and are now in the process of replacing with conventional armed aircraft the nuclear-capable planes still assigned to our forces in North America. We are thus not only the first country in the world with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so; we are also the first nuclear-armed country to have chosen to divest itself of nuclear arms."
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Having broadcast Canada's nuclear disarmament credentials, Trudeau sets the historical and intellectual stage for engaging the century-old "great debate" of "how to achieve security through disarmament." The terms of this debate, he continues, have been altered in the last quarter of a century by two developments: "One was the advent of nuclear weapons which has forced us to assimilate the concept of unusable power. The other was the transformation of the political map which has brought a whole host of new international actors into the disarmament debate."
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He notes that a declaratory approach had for long characterized disarmament efforts, citing the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact, with its renunciation of war, as a classic example. This approach lives on in declarations of no-first use of nuclear weapons (declarations that the USSR had made without reciprocity from the West). While Trudeau acknowledges that such declarations "give expression and authority to a widely shared perception of international morality," he continues, "it is important not to mistake the shadow for the substance.
Declarations of good intent are no substitute for real disarmament." Recognizing that unchecked nuclear weapon development can heighten concerns over the possibility of a disarming first strike or complicate greatly the verification challenge by blurring the line between nuclear and conventional weaponry, Trudeau concludes, "stable deterrence remains an inadequate concept. And such a concept is a poor substitute for genuine world security." Similarly, contemporary strategic arms limitation negotiations between the superpowers have demonstrated that while it is possible to codify an existing balance of forces via such arrangements, it is difficult "to go beyond that and to cut back on weapons systems once they have been developed and deployed." This leads Trudeau to his conclusion that "the best way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear arms race may be by a strategy of suffocation, by depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds."
28

A Package of Measures
The striking metaphor is backed up with four practical measures for accomplishing the goal of arms race "suffocation." Trudeau acknowledges that each of these measures has been independently suggested previously, but suggests that it is their combination that represents "a 27 Ibid., 11.
28 Ibid., 12.
more efficient and a more promising approach to curbing the nuclear arms race." 29 The measures are 1) a comprehensive nuclear test ban, 2) a cessation of flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles, 3) a prohibition on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and 4) an agreement "to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems."
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The "strategy of suffocation" represented by this package would transcend the merely declaratory and have a real impact on the nuclear arms race. It would have that impact, Trudeau expounds, "by freezing the available amount of fissionable material; by preventing any technology that may be developed in the laboratory from being tested; and by reducing the funds devoted to military expenditure." Trudeau suggests that his strategy is a more realistic option than calls for total nuclear disarmament and could reduce the risks of a nuclear conflict that is fuelled by "the technological momentum of strategic competition."
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Trudeau ends this section of his speech (which goes on to address issues of horizontal proliferation and conventional arms control) with a politic nod to the recent decision by US president Jimmy Carter to forego the development of the neutron bomb. Trudeau commends Carter's "far-sighted postponement of a decision to produce a special battlefield nuclear weapon." 32 This is an example of the superpower restraint in the development of nuclear weapons that Trudeau believes could be rendered mutual and suitably codified if the US and USSR would only embrace the "strategy of suffocation" he has outlined.
Reactions and Outcomes
That embrace by the superpowers was not forthcoming, although elements of the Trudeau package have remained central to nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts up to the present. provision of that treaty requiring the ratification of 44 individual states has prevented it formally taking effect. The ban on fissile material production for nuclear weapons has been repeatedly endorsed by the international community as a priority objective, yet its realization has just as frequently been stymied by one or more key actors, with the net result that negotiations of such a ban have never commenced. A ban on flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles has not featured in the negotiations between the US and the USSR/Russian Federation although similar constraints on the development of selected capacities and the deployment of existing ones have featured in their bilateral strategic agreements (e.g., bans on anti-ballistic missile systems, new "heavy" missiles, and MIRVed warheads). While the closing of the funding tap for nuclear weapon development was and remains a very effective constraint on the arms race dynamic, it too has proven beyond the capacity of the major nuclear powers to agree on, and all of the overt nuclear powers are engaged in modernization programs for their nuclear forces.
It appears that Trudeau's speech was well received at the time as the general debate segment of UNSSOD got underway. Citing reactions from other delegations and UN Secretariat officials, the Canadian ambassador to the UN, Bill Barton, wrote on 2 June, "the speech was the most substantial and one of the two or three most important addresses of those delivered thus far." 33 He noted that positive reactions had come from all quarters and that even the Soviet and Polish ambassadors had expressed their admiration. NGO representatives had given the speech particularly high praise, which would have come as a relief to those in Ottawa concerned with Canadian public opinion on this increasingly hot topic. The Canadian media gave it mixed reviews: positive on the part of the Toronto Star and Le Devoir, sharply negative on the part of the Globe and Mail. The prime minister seemed particularly upset at media suggestions that his address to UNSSOD was a publicity gimmick (as if a speech at the UN General Assembly actually generated media coverage).
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Notwithstanding the positive reactions at UNSSOD, Ambassador Barton flagged that getting elements of Trudeau's speech incorporated into the outcome document of the special session itself would be a challenge: "How we will fare remains to be seen, but we shall give it a could be found in the document and the high levels of military spending are roundly condemned, but essentially because they detract from development efforts without reference to their driving role in the nuclear arms race. A major measure like Trudeau's proposed ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was retained but diluted into a general call for negotiations to cease the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the fissile material from which they are produced. Any purposeful, near-term action on the fissile material ban was effectively killed by the nuclear weapon states that were still in the process of building up their nuclear arsenals and were not amenable to cutting off the oxygen supply to this or any other part of their nuclear weapons complexes. The specific "strategy of suffocation" proposals by Canada were relegated 
Conclusions and Legacy
Given the diplomatic context of UNSSOD and the necessity to forge an outcome that all participating states could accept, it would have been unrealistic to expect more extensive take-up of Trudeau's proposals in the final document. At the same time, his speech was an impressive example of an intellectually coherent critique of the existing nuclear disorder and a practical set of measures that if taken up comprehensively could effectively halt the arms race that was the core concern of the international community. The speech's emphases on tangible over declaratory measures and the importance of verification and transparency provisions to support agreements have been refrains of Canadian policy for some time. The military-technical dynamic that propels the constant search to obtain strategic superiority over potential adversaries was rightly viewed by Trudeau as a motor of the arms race requiring political control and mutual restraint. The United States and the Soviet Union were taking initial steps in this regard during the UNSSOD period, having concluded SALT II and initiated discussion on further reductions, but the checkered record of bilateral strategic limitations agreements since then has demonstrated the difficulty of curbing existing arms races and preventing new ones.
Perhaps the most enduring effect of the prime minister's "strategy of suffocation" speech was the impetus it provided within the Canadian bureaucracy to build the capacity required to play a significant role in international arms control and disarmament affairs. In a memorandum to the prime minister shortly after the conclusion of the UNSSOD, the minister of external affairs, noting that "the Special Session on Disarmament had aroused the expectations of many Canadians," announced that he was creating a new office of the Advisor on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs. The first incumbent would be Geoffrey Pearson, the then director general of the UN Bureau. The prime minister simply wrote "excellent" in the margins of the paragraph referring to the new office and its staffing. 41 As with the earlier decision to appoint Ken
Williamson as a public liaison officer for disarmament matters, the Department of External Affairs, with prime ministerial blessing, was establishing some of the institutional capacity necessary to exercise leadership in the demanding realm of international arms control and disarmament.
Looking back at this engagement in arms control and disarmament a few years later, Allan Gotlieb presented it as something of a Canadian vocation. He wrote: "Canada's strong role in disarmament activity has always been a natural calling, with broad public support and strong specialized constituencies." 42 He also indicated that Canada's investment in technical as well as diplomatic capacities would enable it to contribute to the development of arms control agreements. As he stated, "the Canadian reputation for multilateral diplomacy and technical skill enables a national contribution to the technical side of arms control negotiations-such as on the principles and techniques of verification." 43 Ibid., 797.
